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RECENT DECISIONS
INSURANCE-DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-EXEMPTIONS-A married
woman was the beneficiary in a life insurance policy carried by her
husband on his own life. The wife had signed a note for her husband
as a co-maker with him. This note was held by the creditor at the time
of the husband's death. After his death the creditor sought to reach
the proceeds of the insurance policy while the money was still in the
hands of the insurance company. The trial judged dismissed the pro-
ceedings against the insurance company, the garnishee, holding that
the proceeds from the policy while they were in the hands of the com-
pany were exempt from the claims of the wife's creditors. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court with directions
to enter an order denying the garnishee's motion to dismiss. First Wis-
consin National Bank of Milwaukee v. Strelitz, 245 N.W. 74 (Wis.,
1932).
It is within the power of the legislature to allow debtors to retain
some of their goods free from the claims of creditors. The legislature's
powers are broad but they are not unlimited. Bank of J1linden v.
Clement, 256 U. S. 126, 41 S. Ct. 408, 65 L. Ed. 857 (1921). Very
probably the legislature could make such assets as those in question
exempt from the claims of creditors arising as in this case. The Wis-
consin legislature has never purported to allow such exemptions unless
it has done so in section 246.09. Stats. That statute obviously is
intended to protect in certain cases the proceeds and avails of a life
insurance policy carried for a married woman against the creditors
of the insured. If the court in this case had been considering the scope
of this section for the first time the decision as finally given would
scarcely be open to question. But the court had already decided that the
legislature by this section (only in certain cases before the amendment
of 1931) had intended to protect the cash surrender value of the policy
before the death of the insured against the claim of a creditor holding
the joint obligation of the insured and the married woman beneficiary.
Ellison v. Straw, 116 Wis. 207, 92 N.W. 1094 (1903). The trial judge
here apparently felt that the analogy between that case and the present
one was close enough to support his decision. The Supreme Court,
however, decided that the scope of the decision in the earlier case must
be limited by the facts presented in the record of that case.
Once before the court was called upon to consider the effect of the
dcision in the Ellison case. Canterbury v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 124 Wis. 169, 102 N.W. 1096 (1905). There the court decided
in favor of the company which had paid the proceeds of a policy to
the assignee of the insured and beneficiary, a married woman, against
the claim of the beneficiary which she was making after the insured's
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death. In the Canterbury case the court called attention to the fact that
some of the language in the opinion in the Ellison case was too broad
for the decision which in fact the court had been called upon to make.
The analogy between the Ellison case and the present one is close
but it is not complete. Whether the present creditor of the husband, the
insured, or the present creditor of the wife, the beneficiary, will even-
tually be in a position to reach the proceeds of the policy will depend
upon whether the beneficiary in fact survives the insured. Whether the
wife survives the husband, or whether the husband survives the wife,
may not affect in the end the claim of the creditor who holds the joint
obligation of both. Logically, however, neither has any present inter-
est which anyone as the creditor of either can reach.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the present case is plausible
and understandable. Something might be said for the other view if the
general understanding in the state had been that beneficiaries in the
position of the married woman here have had the protection accorded
her. It is suggested that there probably has not been any such general
understanding. Very probably the question has not been presented
before because the insurance companies have been writing policies in
which the insured has retained the right to change the beneficiary even
where the named beneficiary has been a married- woman. Until the
legislature amended section 246.09, Stats., it was not certain that the
cash surrender value of a policy so written was free even from the
claims of the insured's creditors before his death. See In re Grant, 21
F (2d) 88 (W. D., Wis., 1927).
Exemption statutes must be strictly construed. Too many other
questions would soon have been presented to the court, perhaps to the
legislature, had the exemption claimed in this case been allowed. Would
the proceeds of such a policy be exempt from the claims of her cred-
itors after payment to the beneficiary? Would any distinction be made
between obligations incurred by the beneficiary before or after the
insured's death? Would any distinction be made between the claims
oi ordinary creditors of the beneficiary and the claims of those cred-
itors who became such by reason of the beneficiary's obligation as a
co-maker on the insured's note? Could the legislature even purport to
maice any such classification of creditors with respect to exemption
laws and not violate the privilege and immunity clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment? The fixing of the exemptions to be allowed to any
class of debtors is a matter for the legislature to settle. And the legis-
lature must speak expressly. The matter ought not be left to be deter-
mined by judicial construction of a more or less general statute.
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